Blacks and Latinos constitute only thirty percent of the United States population but make up fifty-six percent of the inmates in prisons and jails across the country. 3 The disproportionate numbers of Black and Brown people behind bars should be reason alone to pay attention to the role of race in our criminal justice system, but the United States Supreme Court and many lower courts continue to turn a blind eye to race and the possibility that racial biasexplicit or implicit-may contribute to the decisions that are made by police, prosecutors, and jurors to arrest, charge, and convict. 4 Likewise, many criminal procedure casebooks present the Supreme Court's criminal procedure jurisprudence as a series of race-neutral decisions. If the law professor who teaches Criminal Procedure wants students to think about race, the professor often has to supplement the cases in the traditional casebook with other materials. 5 This Article is aimed at helping the professor who wants to 14/12/05/black-lives-matter-to-everyone-finally/ [http://perma.cc/6NJ3-F99A] (noting that the failure to indict in both the Brown and Garner cases reflected a failure of "the accountability that our criminal justice system strives for"). 5. Assigning supplemental material that focuses attention on racial issues can be risky for an untenured professor or a professor of color since students may resent having to read materials not in the casebook. Some students may think that the professor is pushing his or her own progressive agenda on them. If a professor is concerned about such issues, that professor may wish to adopt a casebook that already incorporates such materials. One criminal procedure incorporate race into the basic criminal procedure curriculum by providing references to specific supplemental materials that the professor can assign to her students.
One who wants to highlight race in the basic criminal procedure class has many opportunities to do so. One can start with Mapp v. Ohio, the case in which the Supreme Court applied the exclusionary rule to the states through the Due Process Clause. 6 Few people know that Dollree Mapp, the woman behind this decision, was a strong-willed Black woman whose refusal to consent to the search of her home and her insistence that the police show her a warrant led to this historic decision. 7 Ms. Mapp's refusal to cede her rights to the police led Professor Wayne LaFave to call her the "Rosa Parks of the Fourth Amendment."
8 While the fact that Ms. Mapp was a Black woman probably had nothing to do with the Court's decision to apply the exclusionary rule to the states, it is noteworthy that a Black woman's refusal to let police search her house without a warrant (just like Rosa Parks' refusal to cede her seat at the front of the bus) was behind arguably one of the most important criminal procedure decisions the Supreme Court has ever issued.
Every criminal procedure professor I know teaches Katz v. United States, the seminal Supreme Court case on what constitutes a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 9 In his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan announced a two-part test for deciding when a search has occurred.
10 "My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'" 11 Even though it was announced in a concurring opinion, the Court has embraced Justice Harlan's reasonable expectation of privacy test as the test for a search.
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On its face, Katz seems like a case that has nothing to do with race or class. 17 The defendants, who were both Black, argued that if police officers are allowed to stop any motorist simply based on probable cause to believe the motorist has committed a traffic violation, "police officers might decide which motorists to stop based on decidedly impermissible factors, such as the race of the car's occupants."
18 In response to this concern, the Court said that any complaint about racial discrimination in being selected by police for a stop had to be vetted under the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment. 19 Arguably, Whren gives police officers cover to engage in racial profiling or the targeting of individuals based on racial stereotypes linked to criminal activity. Since all the officer needs is probable cause to believe the individual in question has committed a traffic violation, the officer can pull over an individual even if the real reason the officer is doing so is because he thinks, based on the individual's race, that the individual is more likely to have drugs or contraband in the car. Many Blacks, including many prominent Blacks, have been subjected to racial profiling. 14. Stuntz, supra note 13, at 1270. 21 In this article, Butler, a prominent criminal law professor at Georgetown Law School, describes the experience of being stopped by police officers who thought he was a burglary suspect when he was walking home from work one evening.
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The only thing Butler had in common with the men suspected of burglarizing the homes in the well-to-do neighborhood where Butler lived and was stopped was that he and they were young, Black, and male. Another article that does an excellent job of helping the reader feel what it is like to be racially profiled is Professor Devon Carbado's (E)racing the Fourth Amendment. 23 In this article, Carbado, a law professor at the University of California at Los Angeles School of Law, describes two experiences in which he was racially profiled and treated like a criminal suspect, even though he was not guilty of any crime.
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When I teach Whren, I also like to assign Professor David Harris' "Driving While Black" and All Other Traffic Offenses, which does an excellent job of critiquing Whren. 25 Harris argues that Whren will end up harming Black and Brown drivers because it gives police officers the green light to engage in racial profiling. 26 As long as the officer can point to an observed traffic violation, the officer can pull over any driver, even if the real reason for the stop is a hunch. 27 Harris points out that the most careful driver cannot avoid violating some traffic law during a short drive. 28 Whren thus gives police the authority to pull over all drivers. The more significant problem, however, according to Harris, is that police will not pull over all drivers who are violating the law. Since they cannot pull over everyone, they will pull over just about being questioned by a police officer who suspected Stevenson, who at the time was a young attorney parked outside his apartment listening to Sly and the Family Stone, was a would-be burglar. BRYAN 34 Hernandez points out that it is quite easy for a law enforcement officer to find some reason other than apparent Mexican ancestry to justify stopping someone of apparent Mexican ancestry. 35 The Brignoni-Ponce Court made this task even easier by spelling out reasons other than Mexican ancestry that can support a stop based on reasonable suspicion of illegal immigration activity. According to the Court, in deciding whether there is reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle, officers may consider factors such as erratic driving, obvious attempts to evade officers, the fact that the vehicle appears to be heavily loaded, the fact that the vehicle contains an extraordinary number of passengers, and the fact that some passengers are trying to hide.
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Hernandez then recounts the time when he and his family were in Seattle, Washington, celebrating his brother's graduation from law school. 41 Johnson notes that in deciding that Mexican appearance was a relevant factor because of the high likelihood that any person of Mexican ancestry is an alien, i.e. an immigrant, the Supreme Court likely relied on the Government's assertion that eighty-five percent of the undocumented population in this country was of Mexican ancestry. 42 Johnson points out that this figure is not an accurate figure since Mexican nationals actually constitute roughly half of the undocumented population, not eighty-five percent of that population. 43 Another type of profiling that occurs is the profiling of transgender individuals as sex workers. The term "walking while trans" has been coined to reflect the fact that police often assume trans people on the street are prostitutes. 53 Pooja Gehi, executive director of the National Lawyers Guild, discusses this type of profiling in Gendered (In)security: Migration and Criminalization in the Security State and points out that poor transgender people of color are often profiled in this way. 54 The automobile exception seems like a subject devoid of racial implications, but Professor David Sklansky shows how Wyoming v. Houghton, 55 one of the main cases on the automobile exception, actually reinforces racial and class bias. In The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, Sklansky critiques the Supreme Court's increasing focus on whether the search in question constituted a search at early common law, as exemplified in Justice Scalia's opinion in Wyoming v. Houghton. 56 Sklansky notes that this originalist focus-Sklansky calls it Scalia's new Fourth Amendment originalism 57 -makes it difficult to address inequities of race and class since eighteenthcentury rules of search and seizure codified class privilege, and did not reflect a commitment to equality.
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Terry v. Ohio 59 provides fertile ground for discussing race. A professor can expose the students to many critiques of this decision. In Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, Professor Anthony Thompson points out that nowhere in the Supreme Court's thirty-nine-page opinion does the Court mention that Terry and one of his companions were Black, the other companion was White, and Officer McFadden was White. 60 In the excerpt that follows, Thompson then explains why this omission matters:
The Court stripped away the racial dimension of the case by removing all references to the participants' race. Although one cannot, of course, reconstruct the reasons for this rhetorical choice, it seems evident at least that this was a conscious choice. In his suppression hearing testimony, Detective McFadden repeatedly referred to the "third man" (Katz) as a "white man"; the lawyers who questioned McFadden did so as well. Yet, the Court's opinion refers to him only as "the third man" or by name.
The removal of race from the case presented the Court with a dilemma, however. To determine whether to uphold McFadden's actions under the new "stop and frisk" doctrine, the Court had to ascertain precisely why McFadden stopped and frisked Terry. After all, an essential element of pre-Terry "probable cause" doctrine-and one the Court carried forward to the new "stop and frisk" rule-was that a search and seizure had to be supported by specific facts that could be weighed by an objective magistrate. But, with race eliminated from the case, the most obvious explanation for McFadden's suspicions and his subsequent actions was unavailable. The Court was left with McFadden's testimony that "he was unable to say precisely what first drew his eye to them."
What the Court did to "make sense" of McFadden's actions is best understood in the terms of narrative theory. As others have explained, a sound judicial opinion requires coherent factual and legal narratives. Such narratives permit the judges to clarify the events in their own minds and to present the facts and law in a manner that the legal community will generally accept. In Terry, the narrative upon which the Court settled was one of the "police officer as expert." 61 In Terry v. Ohio at Thirty-Five: A Revisionist View, Professor Lewis Katz explains how Terry and its progeny permit police to use the fact that the stop took place in a high crime neighborhood as a factor in the reasonable suspicion calculus. 62 Katz argues that this allows a "high crime area" to serve as a proxy for race. 63 Another law review article that can be assigned along with Terry v. Ohio is Professor L. Song Richardson's Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment. 64 In this article, Richardson explains how implicit bias works, and how it can encourage police to stop and frisk Black individuals more often than White individuals. 65 When covering Terry stops and frisks, one can also discuss the fairly recent lawsuit challenging the New York Police Department's stop and frisk policy. In 2008, 66 a group of Blacks and Latinos filed a class action lawsuit against the City of New York ("City"), alleging that the New York Police Department's stop and frisk policy violated their rights under the Fourth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 67 Plaintiffs presented findings from an empirical study by Columbia Law Professor Jeffrey Fagan, showing that between January 2004 and June 2012, the New York City Police Department ("NYPD") conducted more than 4.4 million Terry stops. 68 Over 80% of these 4.4 million stops were of Blacks or Hispanics. 69 Despite this massive effort, weapons were seized in only 1.06% of the stops of Black individuals and 1.25% of stops of Hispanic individuals; contraband was seized in only 1.79% of the stops of Black individuals and 1.73% of the stops of Hispanic individuals.
70 After a bench trial, United States District Court Judge Shira A. Scheindlin found that the City, through its police department, had adopted a policy of indirect racial profiling, targeting young Black and Latino men for stops based on local crime suspect data. 71 In a 198-page opinion, Judge Scheindlin held that the NYPD's stop and frisk policy resulted in the disproportionate and discriminatory stopping of Blacks and Hispanics in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and the Fourth Amendment.
72 According to Judge Scheindlin, the NYPD's policy violated the Equal Protection Clause because it subjected all members of a racially defined group to heightened police enforcement simply because some members of that group are criminals, 73 and it violated the Fourth Amendment rights of the plaintiffs because the stops lacked individualized reasonable suspicion. 74 From a police perspective, Justice Scalia's remarks may make sense . . . . Of course, this viewpoint, never considers that Hodari, a black youth, may have had alternative reasons for wanting to avoid the cops. Many persons who have never committed a crime have ambivalent or negative attitudes about the police. Perhaps, a youth like Hodari flees at the sight of police because he does not wish to drop his pants, as many black youths in Boston have been forced to do, just because cops suspect he belongs to a gang or is selling drugs.
Or maybe Hodari has had an older sibling or friend roughed up by the police, and does not wish to undergo a similar experience with the approaching officers. Perhaps Hodari has seen the video-tape of the Los Angeles police beating and kicking Rodney King, or he has seen the NBC video of Don Jackson, a former police officer himself, being pushed through a store window by Long Beach, California police officers for no reason. Maybe Hodari believed that the officer who wants to ask him "What's going on here?" may engage in similar brutality in his case. As California Assemblyman Curtis Tucker was quoted as saying: "When black people in Los Angeles see a police car approaching, 'They don't know whether justice will be meted out or whether judge, jury and executioner is pulling up behind them. '" 77 Similarly, in Fleeing While Black, Amy Ronner argues there was not enough information to warrant the Wardlow Court's conclusion that Wardlow's flight from police in the neighborhood he was in gave police reasonable suspicion to stop him. 78 In introducing the subject of police interrogations to the students, a professor might encourage students to think about how racial stereotypes and implicit bias might influence the interaction between the police officer and the suspect. In Wrongly Accused: Is Race a Factor in Convicting the Innocent?, the late Professor Andrew Taslitz relies on social science to explain why a police officer may think a Black suspect is lying when it is possible that the individual is simply being defensive and hostile. 87 If one teaches the Edwards rule 88 -the rule that once a suspect in custody asks for an attorney, all questioning must cease until an attorney is presentone knows that under Davis v. United States 89 the suspect must clearly and unambiguously request an attorney in order to trigger the Edwards rule. 90 To get students to think critically about Davis' clear request rule, the professor can assign an excerpt from Professor Janet Ainsworth's In a Different Register: The Pragmatics of Powerlessness in Police Interrogation. 91 In this article, Ainsworth shows how legal rules requiring the use of direct language can adversely affect women and some ethnic minorities who "habitually adopt a speech register including indirect and qualified modes of expression very much like those observed in typical female language use." 92 
CONCLUSION
This Article provides just a sampling of materials that can be used to incorporate the subject of race into the basic criminal procedure curriculum. Many other resources exist from which one can draw to incorporate not only race but also gender, class, sexual orientation, and gender identity into the curriculum.
If one is wondering why one should incorporate issues of race into the law school classroom, there are several good reasons to do so. Professor Cheryl Wade, who teaches Corporations, suggests "it is important to discuss race whenever relevant because [our] students will practice law in a society in which racism is ubiquitous but not always apparent and recognizable." 93 Wade goes on to note that "[i]gnoring issues of race in the law school's core courses and relegating such issues to Law and Race and Critical Race Theory seminars" marginalizes discussions of race. 94 The result is that " [o] nly the students who enroll in 'race courses' have available opportunities to discuss race and racism."
95 Additionally, as Dean Kevin Johnson of the University of California at Davis School of Law suggests, "[i]ntegrating race into class discussion broadens the students' focus beyond the doctrine outlined in the case at hand (without diminishing its importance)," and raises students' awareness of how seemingly race-neutral law implicates social justice concerns. 96 Professor Charles Calleros observes that incorporating issues of race into the classroom is an excellent vehicle for developing critical thinking skills because students usually care deeply about such issues and can challenge one another to analyze the issues from a variety of perspectives. 97 Some might be opposed to efforts to incorporate race into the law school curriculum on the ground that doing so sends a message that White lives do not matter or that they do not matter as much as Black and Brown lives. Such concerns are similar to those that have animated the debate over the Black Lives Matter movement. In the past several weeks, "Black Lives Matter" signs in Bethesda, Maryland, and Washington, D.C., have been vandalized, blocking or cutting out the word "Black" from these signs. 98 The hashtag "#AllLives Matter" has become a popular response to the Black Lives Matter movement.
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Aware of popular sentiment against the Black Lives Matter movement, some presidential candidates have edited their campaign speeches, deleting the word "Black" from the "Lives Matter" slogan. 
